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By William L. Waugh, Jr., PHD
The events of 9/11 created a watershed for the profession
of emergency management. In the post-9/11 world, the preoccupation with
the threat of terrorism has changed political and administrative priorities.
Budget allocations for traditional emergency management programs have
been subsumed in the larger allocations for homeland security, often with
little assurance of the continuity of traditional programs.
The larger programs have subsumed emergency management functions
as well. Although local emergency managers are pleading for "dual use"
programs that will increase capacities for dealing with the more familiar
natural and technological hazards and disasters and for funding of mitigation
programs to reduce the growing dangers of natural disasters, the attention
of national and state policymakers is elsewhere.
Even within the Homeland Security apparatus, minimal attention
is being paid to matters beyond prevention of terrorism-related disasters,
as Secretary Ridge himself has stated. Only recently have inquiries been
made about mitigation possibilities and recovery issues stemming from
a WMD-related event.
For local emergency management personnel, the question is
whether capacities to deal with the more common natural and technological
disasters have been reduced . . . or even lost altogether. As resources
are diverted to counterterrorism programs and new Homeland Security offices
fill up with personnel who are unfamiliar with the language of emergency
management as well as the programs created to deal with natural and technological
hazards, some loss of capacity to deal with those disasters is to be expected.
The front pages are full of stories about inadequate funding
for helping local first responders prepare for and respond to a WMDrelated
event. Part of the problem may be the poor beginning of the Homeland Security
effort, which divided dealing with WMD events into two components: crisis
management and consequence management. These were usually conceptualized
as phases, with consequence management referring merely to dealing with
postevent issues. First responders were mainly seen as those dealing with
the effects of terrorism; their roles in reducing the impact of the events
(mitigation) and thus speeding recovery were largely ignored. Furthermore,
their preparedness was viewed as less important than the preparedness
of law enforcement, military, and (perhaps) fire service personnel and
organizations in preventive roles. Although the distinction in responsibilities
for WMD events has been formally abandoned, the priority still seems to
be on crisis management. The national emergency management system is built
around generic "all-hazards" programs that are adaptable to a spectrum
of potential disasters. The model of mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery has its problems, but it provides both a unifying approach
to dealing with hazards and disasters and a common terminology for emergency
managers and public officials. That is why the State of California formally
adopted the terminology to facilitate communication among its local, regional,
and state agencies.
Still, the model is confusing to those who still see the
four functions as sequential phases rather than overlapping functions.
It is also confusing to those who do not understand that "all-hazards"
does not mean a perfect plan for every conceivable type of disaster. all-hazards
means adaptable plans that provide the basis for dealing with a variety
of hazards and disasters, including terrorism. The plan is the starting
point and having generic evacuation, shelterin place, debris management,
and other programs ready to be adapted to circumstances is far more efficient
and understandable than standalone programs for each type of disaster.
Mitigation measures can be built into response and recovery and preparedness
programs.
The all-hazards approach must be continued. The risks posed
by earthquakes in California and by hurricanes along the Gulf Coast are
potentially far greater than those posed by terrorists. The risks posed
by influenza and other diseases (witness the SARS epidemic) are far greater
than those posed by terrorists with anthrax, sarin, or other biological
and chemical agents. Does a cocktail of "weaponized" biological agents
produced by a "rogue state" or purchased (or stolen) from an old Soviet
weapons lab pose a threat greater than the flu? How many angels can fit
on the head of a pin? In a perverse way, many emergency managers may be
hoping for a catastrophe wrought by seismic or meteorological phenomena
that will remind policymakers that there are forces more powerful than
al-Qaeda and that the capabilities to deal with them need to be maintained.
About the Author
William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD, EditorinChief, Journal
of Emergency Management; Professor, Public Administration and Urban Studies,
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta,
Georgia. For more information visit www.emergencyjournal.com.
Reprinted from Waugh, William L. Jr.:
The "all-hazards" approach must be continued. Journal of Emergency Management,
Winter 2004; 2(1): 1112. Used with permission.
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